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Managerial Trustworthiness and Buybacks 
 
 






CEO trustworthiness is positively related to long-term excess returns after buyback 
announcements. When the CEO is trustworthy, statements that the stock is undervalued are 
more credible. CEO trustworthiness is initially measured by the extent to which people in the 
county where the company headquarters is located trust each other. Further, the positive impact 
of trustworthiness on excess returns is higher when the CEO has been a long-term resident of 
a high-trust county, and correspondingly, trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of 
financial misreporting. Our conclusions are confirmed when we use alternative measures of 
trustworthiness such as employee trust and CEO integrity. 
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Although managers have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize shareholder value, the 
basic assumption of the agency literature in economics and finance is that managers cannot be 
trusted. Thus, they should be incentivized with carrots (e.g., incentive pay) and sticks (e.g., 
monitoring by boards, activist shareholders, and hostile bidders). This relatively cynical view 
of humanity does not allow for the possibility that some managers simply believe that 
maximizing shareholder value is the right thing to do because respecting this implicit contract 
is perceived as an ethical responsibility (Vermaelen (2010)). The argument that social capital 
and the trust that it generates constitute a superior alternative to traditional methods of 
controlling agency problems has received theoretical support from Chami and Fullenkamp 
(2002) and Al-Najjar and Casadesus-Masanell (2001) and empirical support from Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales (2008, 2015). While the empirical evidence is based on country-specific 
measures of trust, the purpose of the current paper is to understand whether CEO 
trustworthiness reduces agency problems in the context of share buybacks and equity issues. 
To test whether managers can be trusted to respect the implicit contract, we need to 
measure trust. We follow work in sociology and economics and define trust as a community-
level construct that reflects the strength of norms and beliefs in the community (Coleman 
(1988), Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam (1993)). Our primary measure of trust is based on 
the General Social Survey (GSS), prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago, the largest 
university-based survey research organization in the United States. The survey covers 333 
counties, representing approximately one-half of total U.S. market capitalization and one-half 
of the U.S. population, and it has been widely used in the academic work on social capital and 
trust and validated by experimental measures in the laboratory and in the field (Glaeser, 
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000), Murtin, Fleischer, Siegerink, Aassve, Algan, 
Boarini, González, Lonti, Grimalda, Hortala Vallve, Kim, Lee, Putterman, and Smith (2018)). 
3 
 
This choice of proxy for the trustworthiness of CEOs is justifiable because individuals 
gradually conform to the values and norms of the counties where they live and work. The idea 
that trust emerges from the interactions between people in the community has a long and 
venerable history in social sciences from de Tocqueville (1835) and Parsons (1937) to more 
recent scholars such as Coleman (1988), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1993, 2000), and Uslaner 
(2002). There is considerable evidence that individuals in communities with higher levels of 
social capital and trust are less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviors (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2016), Hoi, Wu, and 
Zhang (2019)). Thus, we assume that CEOs in high-trust counties are more likely to be 
trustworthy than CEOs in low-trust counties. We validate this assumption by demonstrating 
that trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of financial misreporting. Furthermore, our 
measure assumes that the CEOs have adopted the norms and values of the counties where they 
work, and we validate this assumption by showing that the longer CEOs are situated in high-
trust areas, the more trustworthy they will be. 
We demonstrate the robustness of our results by using two alternative measures of trust. 
The first alternative is an intra-organizational trust measure used by Edmans (2011), 
specifically, whether the employees trust the CEO. The assumption here is that the trust of the 
CEO is based on his or her record of respecting implicit contracts with employees and that such 
a CEO is more likely to respect implicit contracts with others (i.e., shareholders). This measure 
of CEO trustworthiness is based on the annual employee satisfaction survey administered by 
the Great Place to Work Institute for Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work for in America. 
The survey covers topics such as attitudes toward management, job satisfaction, fairness, and 
camaraderie. Across all levels of employees, 250 individuals are randomly selected from each 
firm and asked to complete the surveys anonymously and return their responses directly to the 
Institute. It is important to emphasize that Fortune has no involvement in the company 
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evaluation process, as such involvement could incentivize bias toward companies that advertise 
with Fortune. 
Our second alternative measure of trustworthiness is CEO integrity, which is measured 
by analyzing earning conference call transcripts with machine learning techniques. Li, Mai, 
Shen, and Yan (2020) use a neural network model to analyze Q&A sections of earning call 
transcripts and classify words into different categories of corporate culture, one of which is 
integrity. The presumption is that the choice of words during a conference call reflects the 
prevailing values of the manager, as a trustworthy manager is more likely to use words that 
convey the values in which he or she believes. Using these alternative measures of trust, we 
find that repurchase authorization announcements are followed by higher long-run abnormal 
returns when the CEOs are trusted by employees and when they exhibit a high degree of 
integrity. 
We focus on buybacks and trust in this paper because buybacks are often regarded as 
one of the most controversial corporate decisions. The controversy has even reached the 
political arena, where some politicians are calling for legislation to restrict, if not ban, share 
buybacks. 1  Although announcements of share repurchase programs, on average, generate 
positive short- and long-term excess returns (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Dittmar and Field (2015), Manconi, Peyer, and Vermaelen 
(2019)), not all share buybacks are created equal. Buyback programs can have non-value-
maximizing drivers such as earnings per share (EPS) manipulation (Cheng, Harford, and Zhang 
(2015), Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003)), preventing takeovers by increasing 
managerial ownership (Billet and Hui (2007)) or signaling a lack of investment opportunities. 
The challenge for outside investors is to judge whether a specific buyback announcement is 





Research has suggested various predictive indicators to separate buybacks with good 
and bad drivers. First, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) develop an undervaluation index (U-index) 
that assumes that managers of small, beat-up value stocks are more likely to repurchase shares 
because of undervaluation. The argument is that fewer analysts follow small firms, making 
market inefficiencies more probable. A buyback by a value stock is also much less likely to 
signal a decline in growth opportunities. Finally, a buyback preceded by a stock price decline 
is more likely to be driven by undervaluation than a buyback preceded by a stock price increase. 
Second, Caton, Goh, Lee, and Linn (2016) show that measures of governance quality are 
positively related to short- and long-term excess returns because higher governance quality 
should mean that managers care more about shareholder value. Finally, Evgeniou, Junque de 
Fortuny, Nassuphis, and Vermaelen (2018) show that long-term excess returns are positively 
related to volatility, particularly idiosyncratic volatility. The argument is that if an open-market 
buyback program creates an opportunity to exploit undervaluation, the option is worth more if 
the stock is riskier (Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996)). Moreover, the information advantage of 
managers should be greater if stock prices are largely driven by company-specific information, 
which should correspond to higher idiosyncratic volatility. 
In this paper, we test the predictive power of another variable, trust, and we examine 
the extent to which firm managers who are trusted are more likely to respect the implicit 
contract to create value for long-term shareholders. In addition, we investigate whether 
shareholders of companies with trustworthy managers more readily believe the statements of 
managers when a particular motivation is cited for share repurchase. For example, when 
managers state that they want to buy back shares because they are undervalued (market timing) 
or when they demonstrate a commitment to maximize shareholder value (reducing agency 
costs), is such a statement or promise more credible when the manager is more trustworthy? 
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Note that our measure of CEO trust is less subject to endogeneity concerns. More 
specifically, it is highly improbable that people will trust managers at the time of the buyback 
announcement because they (the people) know that excess returns four years after the buyback 
announcement are positive. Unlike Guiso et al. (2015), we do not claim that trust, in general, 
is associated with higher firm value. Rather, we argue that a specific decision (i.e., the 
repurchase of common stock) is more likely to be driven by concern for long-term shareholder 
value when it is made by a manager who is trusted. As a result, trust is positively correlated 
with long-term stock returns, but not with the decision to repurchase stock or with firm value, 
in general, thereby avoiding endogeneity concerns. 
Although our focus is on long-term excess returns, for the sake of completeness, we 
also test whether trust influences short-term excess returns. Note that a positive relation 
between short-term excess returns and trust results in some strong and often unrealistic 
assumptions. For example, one assumption is that investors who set prices around the 
announcement date are aware of the various trust measures. However, this awareness is 
unlikely, especially if trust is measured using the GSS results from the county in which the 
CEO is located, while the investor lives elsewhere. In the long run, the true consequence of the 
share buyback is revealed, regardless of the shareholder’s knowledge of the GSS or other 
measures of trust. In contrast to making the link between trust and short-term returns, we do 
not need to assume that the marginal investor knows the managerial trust level. Thus, we 
hypothesize that managers who are trusted make better buyback decisions (i.e., buybacks 
motivated by long-term value creation). Hence, we predict a positive relation between CEO 
trustworthiness and long-term excess returns.2 
 
2 Prior research has shown a positive relationship between company reputation and short-term excess returns 
(Bonaimé, 2012; Ota, Kawase and Lau, 2019). In contrast, we do not expect trustworthiness and short-term excess 
returns to be linked. Reputation is based on past observed behavior, such as prior repurchase completion rates or 
management earnings forecast accuracy. . Trust, on the other hand, is a prediction of future behavior. If a person 




We find no significant relation between short-term announcement returns and trust after 
open-market repurchase announcements. However, we find a significant positive relation 
between the three proxies for trust and long-term excess returns. This effect is not only 
statistically significant but also economically significant: An investor who buys shares of 
companies governed by trustworthy managers earns an extra monthly return of 0.2% over the 
next four years. Moreover, when managers state in a repurchase announcement press release 
that their shares are undervalued, long-term excess returns are greater when the trust in the 
manager is higher and when we measure trust using the GSS.3 
We reach this conclusion after controlling for company-specific variables such as the 
U-index and its components, governance quality, compensation incentives and other 
sociodemographic variables that may be correlated with trust, such as population size, 
ethnicity, income, and income inequality (see, e.g., Alesina and Ferrera (2000, 2002)). In 
robustness tests, we further include state fixed effects to control for the possibility that 
buybacks may be driven by state-wide economic conditions (e.g., economic growth or 
unemployment). In all of our test specifications, the trust variable is one of the most robust 
predictors of long-term excess returns. We admit that we do not fully understand why people 
in different counties trust each other more. If trust is driven by very personal reasons (e.g., 
traumatic experiences), then one would expect our trust measure to vary substantially over time 
and have no predictive value for short- or long-term stock returns. However, we document 
evidence that our trust measure is relatively stable. Of course, our lack of knowledge on what 
drives trust applies to other explanatory variables such as past returns. 
Note that by focusing on long-term returns, we focus on the market timing hypothesis 
as opposed to the agency cost hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis, buybacks 
 
trustworthiness is not defined by others and it can go unobserved. Hence, there is no reason to expect trust to 
effect short-term excess returns. 
3 When we measure trustworthiness using an employee satisfaction survey, the small sample size reduces the 
statistical power of the test. 
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create shareholder value because they eliminate excess cash that would otherwise be wasted on 
negative NPV projects. This hypothesis assumes that something is wrong with the investment 
policy of the firm, not with the information efficiency of the market. Both hypotheses have 
different implications for stock price behavior. If the management eliminates excess cash to 
reduce agency costs, stock prices should rise at the time of the announcement. On the other 
hand, if the firm is buying back stock because the shares are undervalued, such timing activity 
will only succeed if the market underreacts to the buyback announcement because the actual 
repurchase takes place after the buyback authorization announcement. Therefore, only the 
market timing motivation predicts long-term excess returns. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to clearly demonstrate that when 
investors assess managerial incentives for repurchasing shares, trust matters. Prior studies have 
documented that trust affects firm performance (Guiso et al. (2015)), financial reporting 
choices (Hasan et al. (2016)), and household investment decisions (Gurun, Stoffman, and 
Yonker (2018)) and that trust is more valuable during a financial crisis (Lins, Servaes, and 
Tamayo (2017)). Using a survey from Great Place to Work as a measure of employees’ trust 
of management, Edmans (2011, 2012) reports a positive correlation between firm performance 
and employee perceptions of managerial ethics. We complement this stream of literature by 
showing that buybacks, as well as public statements that a repurchase is driven by 
undervaluation, are more credible signals of undervaluation when managers are perceived as 
trustworthy. Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the relevance of trust in finance. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and 
hypotheses. In Section III, we test whether trust influences long-term excess returns and 
whether stated buyback motivations in repurchase announcements can be trusted more when 
the firm’s headquarters is in a high-trust county. Section IV describes the validation tests of 
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our trustworthiness measure. We describe various robustness tests in Section V. Section VI 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Data 
A. Share Buyback Sample 
Our sample is constructed at the intersection of buyback announcement data from SDC, 
a buyback news search from Factiva to retrieve data on stated motivations for the buyback 
program, trust data from the GSS, financial and accounting information from Compustat, 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Thomson Reuters, and sociodemographic 
variables from the U.S. Census and several government and nonprofit datasets. 
We collect a sample of open-market share repurchase authorization announcements 
made by U.S. firms between 1992 and 20164. Announcements are obtained from the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Repurchases databases, and stock price and accounting data are 
obtained from CRSP and Compustat for U.S. firms. We focus on open-market share 
repurchases because they are the most common form of repurchase worldwide. We exclude (1) 
going-private transactions by requiring that the percentage of shares sought for the buyback is 
less than 50%, (2) all events from firms in the financial and utility sectors (with Standard 
Industrial Classification [SIC] codes between 40 and 49 and between 60 and 69) because they 
face a very different regulatory and economic environment, and (3) all events with missing 
trust information and control variables. Our final sample consists of 7,649 buyback events from 
1992 to 2016. 
We also collect data on the stated motivation for the buyback program by manually 
searching Factiva for relevant news articles. We classify announcements into five categories. 
The first category comprises announcements from which the stated motivation may be 
 




interpreted as “undervaluation.” UNDERVALUE is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if an announcement falls into this category. Such announcements contain the following 
keywords in the news articles: “undervalue,” “future growth,” “gain in long run,” “confidence 
in future prospects,” “underperform,” “low share price,” “share price is cheap,” and “growth 
in the long run.” The second category comprises announcements from which the stated 
motivation may be interpreted as a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow. 
REDUCE_AGENCY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an announcement falls 
into this category. Such announcements contain the following keywords: “commitment to 
shareholder value,” “return cash to shareholders,” “good use of cash,” “increase shareholder 
value,” and “improve shareholder value.” The third category comprises announcements that 
suggest EPS management. EPS_MGT is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an 
announcement falls into this category. Such announcements contain the following keywords: 
“strengthen EPS,” “avoid dilution,” “reduce number of shares,” and “provide shares for use in 
executive compensation.” The fourth category comprises announcements that indicate that the 
buyback is an expansion or an extension of a previous program. Bargeron, Bonaime, and 
Thomas (2017) find that long-term excess returns are significant only after repeat repurchases. 
EXTEND_BUYBACK is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an announcement 
falls into this category. Such announcements contain the following keywords: “extension of 
buyback,” “expansion of buyback,” and “authorized additional buyback.” Finally, the fifth 
category comprises all of the announcements for which no motivation is mentioned 
(NOT_STATE). Appendix A provides some examples of announcements and their 
classification. Note that an announcement can have multiple stated motivations, for example, 
EPS management and undervaluation. For these events, both the EPS_MGT and 




B. Trust Measures 
We measure public trust using the GSS, a nationally representative survey of attitudes 
and intergroup relations.5 The GSS is a regular, ongoing interview survey of U.S. households 
and is widely regarded as the single best source of data on societal trends. In fact, it is the 
second most frequently analyzed source of information for the social sciences in the United 
States after the U.S. Census.6 The average response rate for the GSS is approximately 76%.7 
Cook and Ludwig (2006, p. 318) indicate that the GSS “is capable of providing representative 
samples at the national or census region or even [the] division level.” The GSS covers 333 
counties, representing approximately one-half of total U.S. market capitalization and one-half 
of the U.S. population. The details of the GSS methodology are relatively technical, and further 
information can be found on the GSS website.8 
We follow prior work on social capital and trust and construct our measure of trust 
based on the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Respondents can answer with “can be 
trusted” (assigned a value of 3), “can’t be trusted” (assigned a value of 1), or “depends or don’t 
know” (assigned a value of 2). We then take the average across respondents to obtain a county-
 
5
The GSS is prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago. NORC is the oldest and largest university-based 
survey research organization in the United States (Lavrakas (2008)). It incorporates methodological experiments 
into each year of GSS data collection. These experiments involve question wording, context effects, the use of 
various types of response scales, random probes, and other assessments of validity and reliability. The basic GSS 
design is a repeated cross-sectional survey of a nationally representative sample of non-institutionalized adults 
who speak either English or Spanish. Subsampling of non-respondents is done to limit survey costs, while 
maintaining a nationally representative sample. The GSS sample is drawn using an area probability 
that randomly selects respondents in households across the United States to take part in the survey. Respondents 
that become part of the GSS sample are from a mix of urban, suburban, and rural geographic areas. Participation 
in the study is strictly voluntary. Social Science Research Instructional Center comments as follows on the quality 
of GSS data: “the GSS tries to follow the highest survey standards in design, sampling, interviewing, processing, 
and documentation. Items are designed by leading specialists in their field and then pretested, full-probability 
sampling is used, a high response rate is obtained, and many data quality checks from validation to verification 
are employed.” More information can be found on the NORC website (http://gss.norc.org/Get-Documentation). 
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NORC_at_the_University_of_Chicago 
7 https://gss.norc.org/Documents/other/Response%20rates.pdf 
8 More technical information on the survey can be found here: http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website. Some of the 
data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the GSS, obtained under special contractual 
arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These data are not available from the authors. 
Persons interested in obtaining GSS Sensitive Data Files should contact the GSS at GSS@NORC.org. 
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level measure of trust for a given year. The average (and median) is approximately 1.8. We 
then transform this trust variable into a dummy variable: counties with an above-median level 
of trust across all 333 counties (nationwide) are given a value of one, and counties with a below-
median level of trust are given a value of zero. This transformation makes interpreting 
regression coefficients more straightforward. As shown in Section V, our results hold if we use 
continuous trust measures. Information on trust at the county level is available for every other 
year from 1992 until 2016, albeit not consecutively for every county. Other dimensions of trust 
(e.g., trust across racial lines, trust across socioeconomic status, trust in the federal government) 
are also measured but much more haphazardly. In our main tests, we follow previous studies 
(e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)) and linearly interpolate the data to obtain values for the 
missing years. Approximating trust linearly increases the power of our tests and gives us the 
opportunity to study the time-series properties of our setting, but as discussed in Section V, the 
results also hold when we do not linearly interpolate trust. 
The trust question is widely accepted in research (for recent reviews, see Delhey, 
Newton, and Welzel (2011), Nannestad (2008)), and it is used in other large-scale attitudinal 
surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey. Moreover, 
experimental work shows that the self-reported trust measure is a good predictor of actual 
trustworthy behavior (Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003), Glaeser 
et al. (2000)). Using a sample of 189 Harvard students, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that individual 
responses to the trust question were strongly and significantly correlated with trustworthy 
behavior in the trust game. Their finding is replicated by Lazzarini, Madalozzo, Artes, and 
Siqueira (2004) in a face-to-face experimental setting in Brazil. Algan, Benkler, Fuster Morell, 
and Hergueux (2013) show that the measure is a good gauge for trustworthy behavior in 
settings rife with collective action problems and freeriding, such as Wikipedia and open source 
software development communities. These findings are confirmed by Murtin et al. (2018), who 
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conduct a large-scale trust experiment in six countries and found that self-reported measures 
of trust correlate with trustworthiness as well as cooperation and altruism. 
Following the previous literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005), Loughran and Schultz (2004), Pirinsky and Wang (2006)), we define a 
firm’s location as the location of its headquarters. As noted by Pirinsky and Wang (2006, p. 
1994), this approach appears “reasonable given that corporate headquarters are close to 
corporate core business activities.” We extract historical headquarters locations from previous 
10-K filings available on Edgar. If the data are not available on Edgar, we use the value in the 
closest year for which data are available. TRUST is our main proxy for the market’s prior 
evaluations of CEO trustworthiness. 
 
C. Long-Term Announcement Returns 
We calculate long-term announcement returns using the Fama-French (2015) five-
factor model (ADJ_RET5). We obtain estimates of the long-run risk-adjusted returns for 
individual firms in the spirit of Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) as follows. For 
a given stock in a given calendar month, the one-factor risk-adjusted return is computed as the 
risk-free rate of return plus the residual from a regression of the stock’s excess return on the 
Fama-French five-factor model. Risk-adjusted returns are then averaged over the 48 months 
following the announcement date to obtain the risk-adjusted average monthly returns. 
 
D. Control Variables 
Following prior studies (e.g., Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Bens, et al. (2003)), we 
control for firm size (LOG_MTKCAP), leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), book-to-market ratio 
(BTM), institutional ownership (IO), capital expenditures (CAPEX), dividend payout policy 
(PAYOUT), return on assets (ROA), asset liquidity (LIQUID_ASSETS) and, following 
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Evgeniou et al. (2018), estimates of volatility (VOLATILITY) and idiosyncratic volatility 
(IDIO_RISK). 
Furthermore, we consider whether the undervaluation index (U-index) developed by 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) remains a robust indicator of abnormal returns to separate 
companies that are buying back stocks because they are undervalued from companies that 
repurchase shares for other reasons. We calculate the U-index as follows. A given firm receives 
a prior return “score” of 5 if its return before the buyback announcement is in the lowest quintile 
of all of the CRSP firms’ prior 6-month returns in a given month. Firms in the highest prior 
return quintile receive a score of 1. Size and book-to-market scores are similarly assigned, with 
large firms receiving low scores (they are less likely to be mispriced) and high book-to-market 
firms receiving high scores (a value stock is more likely to buy back stock because it is 
undervalued than a growth stock). The U-index is the sum of the prior return, size, and book-
to-market scores and ranges from 3 (least undervalued) to 15 (most undervalued). 
Although we focus on the impact of CEO trust on abnormal returns of buybacks, 
concurrent changes in other social and economic conditions may drive changes in both trust 
and excess returns. Specifically, we include the following county-year characteristics: 
population (POPULATION), religion (RELIGIOSITY), gender distribution (%FEMALE), 
education (EDUCATION), income per capita (INCOME), ethnicity diversity (ETHNICITY), 
income inequality (INCOME_INEQUALITY), and political affiliation 
(%VOTE_DEMOCRATS). Consistent with prior studies such as McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 
(2012), we do not make predictions about the association between our demographic control 
variables and the various dependent variables we examine. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the top and bottom percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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E. Summary Statistics 
Our sample consists of 7,649 buyback announcements made by 2,523 firms during the 
period 1992 to 2016. In Table 1, Panel A provides summary statistics and Panel B provides 
statistics on the stated motivations in the buyback press release. 
Table 1, Panel A shows that the average value of the high-trust dummy is 0.56, 
indicating that a typical repurchasing firm is headquartered in a relatively high-trust county. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the trust measure across states. The level of trust is generally 
higher near the Canadian border. For example, of the 50 states for which we have data related 
to trust, Montana ranks third and Wisconsin ranks fourth. The level is intermediate on the coasts 
(e.g., New York State ranks 23rd). It is lower in states near the Mexican border (e.g., Texas 
ranks 38th) and in the South (e.g., Arkansas ranks 46th and Mississippi ranks 47th). Although 
trust is measured by polling different individuals in different years, our trust measure is 
relatively stable. Specifically, 92.10% (92.70%) of high (low) trust counties at t−1 remain in 
the same category in year t. 
Panel A shows that buyback announcements are preceded by 6-month returns of 1.5%. 
Repurchasing firms tend to be profitable (average ROA of 7.3%) with a leverage ratio of 17%. 
The average (median) U-INDEX is 9, slightly above the value that one would expect if a typical 
repurchasing firm were not overvalued or undervalued (i.e., 8). 
With respect to the motivation for the share buyback, Panel B shows that approximately 
48% of the announcements do not provide any motivation for pursuing the repurchase. Overall, 
15.8% and 25.4% of announcements explicitly state undervaluation and reducing agency costs 
as the motivations for buyback transactions, respectively. Furthermore, 3.5% cite EPS 
management as the motivation, and 7.3% of the sample is an extension of a previously 
announced buyback program. 
16 
 
Table 2 provides the univariate correlations between TRUST and the different 
variables. TRUST is low in highly populated counties with more females and more income 
inequality and high in counties populated with more educated high-income inhabitants. 
EDUCATION is the variable most positively correlated with TRUST (correlation of 0.26). As 
expected, the U-INDEX is highly negatively correlated with prior returns (−0.57) and market 
cap (−0.75) and positively correlated with the book-to-market ratio (0.67). The U-INDEX and 
UNDERVALUE have a low correlation. This does not mean that CEOs in counties with low 
trust lie about being undervalued. It could simply mean that a high U-index (the firm is a small 
value stock that experiences a large stock market decline prior to the buyback announcement) 
makes it obvious to investors that the buyback is motivated by undervaluation. Therefore, a 
confirmation in a press release is less necessary. We will show in Table 6 that in the long-run, 
the trust variable is a better predictor of stock returns when the firm mentions undervaluation 
as a motivation for the buyback, controlling for other characteristics. 
III. Empirical Evidence: Long-Term Excess Returns 
A. Main Findings 
Table 1, Panel A shows that, on average, firms experience 0.6% excess returns per 
month (over 48 months) after buyback authorization announcements. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that, at least on average, the market underreacts to buyback announcements 
and that managers are successful at market timing. Table 3 regresses monthly long-term excess 
returns against trust and other variables proposed in the literature, controlling for county-
specific variables. Long-term excess returns are estimated using the Fama-French five-factor 
model.9 The first two columns use the components of the U-INDEX (prior returns, market cap, 
 
9 We obtain similar results when we use the Carhart four-factor model or market model. For brevity, we do not 
tabulate these results. 
17 
 
and book-to-market ratio) as control variables, and the last two columns use the U-INDEX. 
Columns (2) and (4) control for other county-specific variables in addition to TRUST. 
We find that long-term excess returns are significantly positively correlated with 
TRUST across all columns.10 When CEO trust is relatively high, excess returns are 0.2% higher 
per month, which equates to 2.4% per year. Furthermore, because excess returns after buyback 
announcements are significantly positive for at least four years, this effect is highly 
economically significant. Consistent with Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we find that the U-
INDEX remains a highly significant and positive predictor of long-term abnormal returns 
across all regression specifications and that all its components (prior return, size, and book-to-
market) are statistically significant at the 10% level. Turning to the stated motivations for the 
buyback, companies that mention undervaluation and companies that extend a previous 
buyback experience significantly higher long-term excess returns. Statements consistent with 
agency cost reductions appear to have no impact on long-term excess returns. One explanation 
is that the reduction in the agency cost effect is fully priced at the time of the buyback 
authorization announcement. Unlike the market timing hypothesis, which assumes that 
investors underreact to the buyback authorization announcement, the agency cost hypothesis 
does not predict long-term excess returns. 
Buyback authorization extensions are followed by significantly higher long-term 
excess returns, suggesting that managers are better at market timing when they have more 
 
10 In un-tabulated results, we examine the effect of trust on short-term announcement returns. We measure 
cumulative abnormal return over 7-day window around the buyback announcement. We find that excess returns 
are significantly positively related to the U-index and the book-to-market ratio and negatively related to prior 
returns and market capitalization. The U-index is the most statistically significant predictor of short-term 
announcement returns. However, the trust variable is never significant, which is not unexpected, as it would 
require the unrealistic assumption that investors are, at the time of the announcement, aware of the trust level and 
incorporate this information into pricing. Unlike reputation, that is based on past observed behavior, 
trustworthiness is not immediately observed. If our measure was a proxy for reputation, we should find a positive 
relationship between trust and short-term excess returns. However, we do not find that. Thus, it does not appear 




experience buying back stock. Our results are not consistent with a situation in which firms 
manipulate stock prices because they know that buybacks will be well received. If this is the 
case, we should observe a reversal in the long-run returns for these firms. However, we observe 
the opposite. Consistent with the findings of Evgeniou et al. (2018), measures of idiosyncratic 
and total risk are significantly positively related to long-term excess returns. Columns (2) and 
(4) further control for additional sociodemographic variables. Adding these control variables 
has no impact on the economic or statistical significance of TRUST, the U-INDEX, or other 
company-specific variables. Most of the sociodemographic characteristics are not significant. 
Overall, we find that TRUST, the U-INDEX and its components, volatility, and the 
undervaluation motivation dummy are significantly and positively related to long-term excess 
returns. 
 
B. Trust and Long-Term Excess Returns: A Closer Look 
The next step in our analysis is to form calendar time portfolios that sort long-term 
excess returns into four trust levels and test the extent to which CEO trust alone can explain 
the cross-sectional variance of long-term excess returns. We also test the robustness of our 
findings by using the Fama-French four-factor model. Finally, we test whether the relation 
between CEO trust and long-term excess returns depends on the investment horizon. 
We conduct a long-term event study using the calendar time method. For each calendar 
month, we construct an equally weighted portfolio, including all of the firms that made a 
repurchase announcement in the previous 12 months (or 24, 36, or 48 months depending on 
the horizon). The composition of the portfolio thus changes each month. The average monthly 
abnormal return of the portfolio is then regressed against the four factors (when we use the 
Fama-French four-factor model) or five factors (when we use the Fama-French five-factor 
model). The intercept of the regression is thus the average monthly abnormal return in the 12 
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(or 24, 36, or 48) months after the buyback announcement. The advantage of this method is 
that each event month obtains the same weight, eliminating the biases created by clustering. 
For each horizon, we form four portfolios based on trust quartile. The results are shown in 
Table 4. The results confirm those from Table 3. Regardless of the investment horizon or the 
factor model used for the benchmark, high CEO trust portfolios always outperform low CEO 
trust portfolios. For example, Figure 2, Panel A, which plots the average returns against the 
CEO trust quartile over a 48-month investment horizon, reveals the monthly excess return of 
0.7% in the highest trust quartile is nearly twice as large as that in the lowest trust quartile 
(0.35%). Note that the difference between excess returns in the first and last trust quartiles is 
always larger when we use the five-factor model rather than the four-factor model. 
Table 5 tests how the interaction between TRUST and U-INDEX affects long-term 
excess returns. On one hand, it may well be that TRUST and the U-INDEX reinforce each 
other, suggesting that investors who want to exploit the buyback anomaly should invest in high 
U-index firms with trustworthy CEOs. On the other hand, it is also possible that TRUST and 
the U-INDEX are substitutes: when trust is high, the buyback is driven by undervaluation, even 
when the U-index suggests otherwise. We compute monthly excess returns for nine (three-by-
three) double-sorted portfolios for each investment horizon (12, 24, 36, and 48 months) and for 
each of the two factor models. First, we form three portfolios based on the TRUST tercile. 
Within each trust level, we construct three portfolios based on the level of the U-INDEX. We 
calculate the portfolio returns based on equal-weighted portfolios. As undervaluation is more 
probable in small-cap stocks, value weighting would bias the results against finding positive 
excess returns. 
Our results show that regardless of whether trust is low or high, the U-INDEX is a 
strong predictor of long-term excess returns. When trust is low, on average, the difference 
between monthly excess returns in the high and low U-index portfolios ranges from 0.36% 
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(four-factor model, 48 months) to 0.78% (five-factor model, 24 months) across all eight 
comparisons in Table 5, depending on the investment horizon and benchmark model used to 
calculate abnormal returns. When trust is high, the difference between the monthly excess 
returns in the high- and low-U-index portfolios ranges from 0.37% (four-factor model, 12 
months) to 0.91% (five-factor model, 24 months). It is clear from Figure 2, Panel B that trust 
and the U-index do not substitute for one another but instead complement each other. Indeed, 
across models and investment horizons, except for the 12-month horizon, the highest excess 
returns are observed in the high-U-index, high-trust portfolios (Table 5). At the same time, in 
five out of the eight comparisons, the lowest monthly excess returns are observed in the low-
trust, low-U-index portfolios. 
 
C. Buyback Motivations and CEO Trust 
When managers state in press releases that their company is undervalued or that it is 
committed to maximizing shareholder value, a question that arises is whether markets attribute 
greater credibility to these statements when the managers are trustworthy. To answer this 
question, we moderate our regression to include interaction between TRUST and the 
motivational variables. The results in Table 6 indicate that the statement that the stock is 
undervalued only adds to long-term excess returns when the CEO is perceived as trustworthy. 
When the CEO is perceived as trustworthy, a statement that the shares are undervalued adds 
0.2% per month to long-term excess returns (i.e., 9.6%) after four years. This effect is 




IV. Validation of the CEO Trustworthy Measure and Alternative Measures of 
Trustworthiness 
 We use a geography-based trust measure to proxy CEO trustworthiness. To validate 
this assumption, we correlate this trust measure with corporate decisions that are under the 
CEO’s direct influence. We hypothesize that trustworthy CEOs are less likely to betray the 
trust bestowed on them and engage in fraudulent activities. If our geography-based trust 
measure captures CEO trustworthiness, we expect a strong negative association between trust 
and fraudulent activities. The fraudulent activity examined in this paper is corporate financial 
misreporting, and we expect that trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be investigated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for enforcement actions. We obtain Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) information from the SEC website. AAERs 
capture financial reporting related to enforcement actions associated with civil lawsuits brought 
by the SEC in federal court as well as notices and orders concerning the institution and/or 
settlements of administrative proceedings. AAER is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if a firm is investigated by the SEC in that year, and zero otherwise. We then merged it 
with trust data from GSS and financial information from the Compustat and CRSP database. 
Our final sample consists of 35,975 firm-year observations over the period of 1992 to 2016. 
The AAER dummy is then regressed on TRUST and control variables, while controlling for 
firm and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.11 Panel A of 
 
11 For the AAER regression, we adopt the linear probability model and use the OLS method to estimate the 
regression. The benefit of using the linear probability model is that it can easily accommodate firm fixed effects 
to absorb any time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics that might affect financial reporting behavior. 
However, as the dependent variable is an indicator, we re-estimate the regression using a logit model. We estimate 
the logit model with firm and year fixed effects using the STATA command xtlogit. Two things are worth noting. 
First, Stata will automatically drop observations if there are no within-group variations in the outcome variables. 
In other words, only firms with at least one violation are retained in the estimation. This will reduce the number 
of observations. Second, xtlogit cannot accommodate clustering at firm level. Therefore, we have to calculate 





Table 7 reports the results. We find that TRUST is negatively correlated with AAER 
enforcement actions, which suggests that trustworthy CEOs are less likely to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
Our analysis rests on the premise that CEO trustworthiness affects investors’ reactions 
to buyback news and long-term returns. To the extent that CEOs are raised in places with low 
trust or move across states with different levels of trust during their lifetime, measurement bias 
enters into our trust measure. While it is difficult to obtain data on the birthplaces of CEOs or 
perfectly track the movement of CEOs throughout their careers, we hypothesize that CEO 
tenure at a company should moderate the trust-announcement returns we documented. In 
particular, CEOs who work in high-trust areas for a longer period of time are more likely to 
have accepted the values of the area. 12 To implement this idea, we moderate our main 
specifications to include TRUST×CEO_TENURE, and we obtain CEO tenure information 
from Execucomp. Our sample size drops to 5,092 observations for the buyback sample because 
of the unavailability of tenure information from the database. Table 8 shows that CEO tenure 
alone does not affect long-run returns. However, the coefficients are positive and significant at 
the 10% level for TRUST×CEO_TENURE. The results suggest that the longer the CEOs are 
situated in high trust areas, the more trustworthy they will be.  
We demonstrate the robustness of our results by using two alternative measures of trust. 
The first measure is the employee trust of managers. The assumption is that the trust of the 
CEO is based on his record of respecting implicit contracts with employees and that such a 
 
12 Note that we assume that the company has been located in the county long enough that the trust level of the 
county measures the CEO trustworthiness. This is a realistic assumption considering that corporations seldom 
change headquarters location given the transaction costs involved. Chow, Huang, Klassen, and Ng (2020) examine 
headquarters relocation within the United States over the sample period of 1998 to 2018, and they find that only 
2.2% of firms in the Compustat (excluding financial firms) change corporate headquarters. In our sample, out of 
7,649 buyback announcements, only 222 announcements associated with 166 firms involve firms that change 
corporate headquarters. To mitigate the concern that corporate relocation affects our trust measure, we re-estimate 
the long-run announcement effect excluding those 222 announcements. The results (not tabulated) show our 




CEO is more likely to respect implicit contracts with others (i.e., shareholders). We measure 
CEO trustworthiness using the employee satisfaction survey administered by the Great Place 
to Work Institute and published in Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work for in America. This 
survey covers topics such as attitudes towards management, job satisfaction, fairness, and 
camaraderie. Across all levels of employees, 250 are randomly selected from each firm to 
anonymously complete the surveys and return them directly to the Institute. It is important to 
emphasize that Fortune has no involvement in the evaluation process that could create bias 
toward those companies that advertise with Fortune. We intersect our buyback sample with 
this trust measure, which results in a much smaller sample of only 139 event-year observations. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results. Despite a reduced sample, which weakens the power of 
our tests, a positive association between long-run returns and EMPLOYEE_TRUST is found, 
with the results highlighting that trustworthy CEOs exhibit consistent behavior toward 
employees and shareholders. 
Finally, Li et al. (2020) propose an alternative measure of corporate culture by using 
machine learning techniques to analyze earnings call transcripts. In particular, they focus on 
the Q&A section of the earning call transcripts from 2001 to 2018, and they use a neural 
network model to classify words into five different categories of corporate culture, namely, 
integrity, respect, innovation, quality, and teamwork. Accordingly, they find that a strong 
corporate culture is associated with better firm performance and corporate decisions. To further 
mitigate the potential measurement problem of our measure for trustworthiness, we re-estimate 
our regression using their measure.13 The presumption is that the choice of words during a 
conference call reflects the prevailing values of a manager. That is, trustworthy managers are 
more likely to use words that convey the values in which they believe. Using this alternative 
 
13 We thank Rui Shen for sharing the data with us. 
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measure of trust, the results in Panel C of Table 7 suggest that CEOs with high integrity 
generate better long-run abnormal returns.14 
 
V. Robustness Tests 
The GSS extracts a nationally representative sample with every wave, thus capturing 
the diversity in opinions across all American demographics. Although the number of 
participants and survey response rate may vary across time, there is no reason to believe that 
the sampling method introduces a systematic bias in our results. However, to mitigate such 
concerns, we conduct several additional tests. First, to ensure that our results are not driven by 
firms located in small counties that happen to be sampled by GSS in a particular year, we repeat 
our analysis focusing on firms located in large counties15. Table 9 Panel A indicates that our 
inference remains the same16. Second, to mitigate the concerns that our measures may be 
affected by the differences in survey response rates across counties, we repeat our analysis 
using weighted least square regression in which the weight is the number of responses to the 
GSS survey scaled by the county population. This process essentially assigns greater weight to 
observations with a higher response rate. The results in Panel B reveal that our conclusions are, 
for the most part, the same. That is, trust is positively associated with abnormal returns in three 
out of four regressions for buyback announcements. Third, the GSS does not measure the trust 
level in every period. In our baseline test, we linearly interpolate the estimates. As a robustness 
 
14 A CEO’s integrity measure is developed from Li et al. (2020), and it captures both integrity-related words and 
respect-related words from earnings conference calls. We include respect-related words because the authors’ 
definition of respect captures words associated with corporate culture and attitude towards employees and 
stakeholders. Our results remain significant at the 10% level if we only include integrity-related words from Li et 
al. (2020). 
15 We define large counties are those with population above median in a year. 
16 To mitigate the concern that our results might be driven by a few firms located in high trust counties, we re-
estimate our regressions using the following subsamples. First, we re-estimate our regressions by excluding the 
top 20 most populous counties in a year. If large firms are more likely to locate in populous counties, this 
robustness test focuses on a subsample of firms that are not located in big cities. This approach should to a large 
extent alleviate  concerns that our results are driven by a handful of firms. Second, we re-estimate our regressions 
by excluding the top 20 counties with the largest number of firms for each of the high and low trust subsamples. 
Our inference remains robust for both approaches, albeit with a smaller sample size. 
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test, we focus on observations for which we have a direct measurement of trust. Although our 
sample size is reduced by approximately 60%, our main results still hold. The results in Panel 
C show that TRUST is significantly (at the 1% level) related to long-term excess returns in all 
model specifications. The economic impact of TRUST on long-term excess returns is now 
larger than those in Table 3 in three out of the four regression specifications. Hence, measuring 
TRUST correctly increases its economic impact, a result that should not be surprising. Fourth, 
we use the trust dummy variable as our main measure for ease of interpreting interaction 
variables. We perform robustness tests using the continuous trust variable. The results in Panel 
D show that our conclusions are not affected. Fifth, we control for an array of county-year level 
sociodemographic controls in all the regressions, and to further mitigate the concern that our 
results are confounded by omitted correlated sociodemographic variables or state-level 
economic conditions, we further include state fixed effects. In other words, we perform within-
state, industry and year comparisons between firms led by high and low trustworthy CEOs. 
The results in Panel E indicate that our conclusions are not affected. 
Our main specification uses institutional ownership as the main proxy for governance 
quality, mainly because ownership data are widely available for many firms. Our sixth 
robustness test further controls for the difference in governance quality, measured by the 
entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell (2009)). Panel F reports the results, and our 
conclusions are not affected. Next, to mitigate concerns that trust might be associated with 
CEO compensation, we control for different dimensions of CEO compensation structures such 
as total compensation, the percentage of equity compensation, and compensation incentives 
measured by portfolio delta and vega. Panel G shows that we continue to find consistent results. 
As a final robustness test, we examine equity issues. We test whether short- and long-
term excess returns after equity issues are related to the trustworthiness of CEOs. Equity issues 
could reveal agency costs of free cash flow problems; for example, managers issue equity to 
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obtain more free cash flow, which may be wasted on negative-NPV projects (Jensen (1986)). 
In such a case, trusted managers are less likely to engage in shareholder value-destroying 
activities, meaning that, as in the case of buybacks, excess returns will be positively related to 
trust. However, managers could also be driven by market timing because managers who believe 
their shares are overvalued are incentivized to issue overvalued stock to benefit long-term 
shareholders (shareholders who are locked in because of control considerations or other 
restrictions). To the extent that markets underestimate the extent of overvaluation, long-term 
excess returns will be negative. Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995) are the first to document evidence that equity issues are followed by negative long-term 
excess returns in the United States. Baker and Wurgler (2002) contend that market timing is 
the first-order determinant of capital structure. According to this market timing hypothesis, 
managers who are concerned about the wealth of the current long-term shareholders should 
issue shares when they are not undervalued or possibly overvalued. This market timing 
hypothesis predicts a negative relation between long-term returns and trust. In other words, it 
is not obvious whether returns after equity issues will be positively or negatively related to trust 
ex ante. This ambiguity makes equity issues an ideal contrasting event with buybacks. Our 
sample consists of 2,407 equity announcements made by 1,418 firms during the period of 1992 
to 2016. 
Consistent with the ambiguous prediction of the relation between trust and returns, we 
find no significant relation between our proxies for trust and short- or long-term announcement 
returns following equity issues (un-tabulated). This ambiguity also suggests that the trust 





Firms that announce share repurchase programs and are run by trustworthy CEOs 
experience statistically significantly higher long-term excess returns. This conclusion is 
supported using three different proxies for trustworthiness, namely, county-specific trust, 
employee trust, and CEO integrity measured from linguistic analysis. Together with indicators 
of the likelihood of undervaluation (the U-index), trust is the most consistent predictor of long-
term excess returns. When firms state in press releases that they are buying back stocks because 
of undervaluation, their statement is more credible when announced by a trustworthy CEO, as 
long-term excess returns are significantly larger. Trust and the likelihood of undervaluation 
(measured by the U-INDEX) are complements; after share buybacks, independent of the level 
of trust, high-U-index firms always experience larger excess returns than low-U-index firms. 
This paper is part of a growing body of literature showing that investors care about trust 
when assessing whether shareholder value maximization drives managerial decisions. In the 
context of buybacks, this is particularly relevant because repurchases can be driven by bad and 
good motivations. This finding means that the agency costs of equity and information 
asymmetry can be reduced by not only designing explicit contracts or costly signaling 
mechanisms but also promoting implicit contracts. In the United States, managers have an 
implicit contract to maximize shareholder value. However, such a contract is more likely to be 
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Appendix A. Examples of Buyback Announcements and Buyback Reasons Coding 
Examples of Buyback Announcements and Buyback Reason Coding 
Only One Reason Provided    
Company Date Announcements or Press Releases Buyback Reasons Coding 
Alltrista Corporation 23 March 1999 
INDIANAPOLIS, March 23 /PRNewswire/ -- Alltrista 
Corporation’s (NYSE: ALC) board of directors today authorized the 
repurchase of up to 500,000 shares of the company’s common stock. 
Thomas B. Clark, president and chief executive officer, said the 
repurchase authorization represents 7.4 percent of the company’s 
outstanding common stock. “Management and the directors agree 
that, although we are implementing an aggressive growth strategy, 
Alltrista shares are significantly undervalued and that a share 
repurchase program represents a wise use of shareholder funds at 
current price levels,” said Mr. Clark.  
Undervaluation 
Acme United Corporation 23 January 2008 
FAIRFIELD, Conn. - (BUSINESS WIRE) - Acme United 
Corporation (AMEX:ACU) announced today that its Board of 
Directors approved a new stock repurchase program of up to 
150,000 common shares. Walter C. Johnsen, Chairman and CEO, 
said, “We are pleased to announce this buy-back program as it 
demonstrates management’s commitment to build long term 
shareholder value.” 
Reduce Agency 
Procter & Gamble Co. 27 March 1995 
CINCINNATI (Reuter) - Procter & Gamble Co. said Monday it will 
repurchase four to five million shares of its common stock to 
eliminate any dilution of per-share earnings resulting from 
management compensation programs. 
EPS Management 
Emerson Electric Co. 6 May 2008 
Dow Jones News Service, 11:53 PM, 6 May 2008, 97 words, 
(English). DOW JONES NEWSWIRES Emerson Electric Co. 
(EMR) said Tuesday its board approved the repurchase of up to 80 
million shares over the next four to five years. 
Not Stated 
Harman International Industries Inc. 14 March 2005 
SAN FRANCISCO, March 14 (Reuters) - Harman International 
Industries Inc. (HAR.N), a maker of professional and consumer 
audio products, said on Monday it has reinitiated a previously 
announced program to repurchase its own stock. 
Extend Buyback 
    
    
Multiple Reasons Provided    
Company Date Announcements or Press Releases Buyback Reasons Coding 
Lattice Semiconductor Corporation 21 October 2010 
HILLSBORO, Ore., Dec 6 (Reuters) - Logic device maker Lattice 
Semiconductor Corp. said on Wednesday its board authorized the 
company to repurchase up to 5 million shares of its common stock. 
Hillsboro, Ore.-based Lattice said repurchased shares will be used to 





purpose of the stock repurchase program is to manage dilution and to 
effectively utilize our cash balances to increase shareholder value. 
The program itself reflects our Board of Directors’ and 
management’s continuing commitment to our shareholders. 
Anheuser-Busch 24 July 1996 
ST. LOUIS, Mo., July 24, 1996 -- The Board of Directors of 
Anheuser-Busch. Companies, Inc. has approved a new 25 million 
share repurchase authorization, “These actions reflect Anheuser-
Busch’s record results for the first six months of 1996 and 
confidence in the future growth and performance of the company. 
We are better positioned than ever to achieve increased industry 
leadership, double-digit earnings per share growth and enhanced 
shareholder value,” Mr. Busch said. These actions are also consistent 
with Anheuser-Busch’s well-defined priorities for its operating cash 
flow: 
• Reinvestment in core businesses to achieve profitable growth. 
• Repurchasing shares of common stock. 





Appendix B. Variable Definitions  
Variables Definition 
TRUST TRUST was constructed from the General Social Survey (GSS). The survey asks 
whether people can be trusted, and respondents can answer “can be trusted” 
(assigned a value of 3), “can’t be trusted” (assigned a value of 1), or “depends 
or don’t know” (assigned a value of 2). We then take the average across all of 
the respondents from one county to obtain a county-level measure of trust for 
each year. When the trust measure is not available for a year, we interpolate the 
value from the most recently available value. TRUST is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if the value is above median across all counties 
(nationwide), and zero otherwise. 
ADJ_RET5 We calculate long-term announcement returns using the Fama-French (2015) 
five-factor model. We obtain estimates of the long-run risk-adjusted returns for 
individual firms in the spirit of Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) as 
follows. For a given stock in a given calendar month, the one-factor risk-adjusted 
return is computed as the risk-free rate of return plus the residual from a 
regression of the stock’s excess return on the Fama-French five-factor model. 
Risk-adjusted returns are then averaged over the 48 months following the 
announcement date to obtain the risk-adjusted average monthly returns. 
UNDERVALUE An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions the 
following keywords in the news article announcing the buyback: “undervalue,” 
“future growth,” “gain in long run,” “confidence in future prospects,” 
“underperform,” “low share price,” “share price is cheap,” and “growth in the 
long run.” 
REDUCE_AGENCY An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions the 
following keywords in the news article announcing the buyback: “commitment 
to shareholder value,” “return cash to shareholders,” “good use of cash,” 
“increase shareholder value,” and “improve shareholder value.” 
EPS_MGT An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions the 
following keywords in the news article announcing the buyback: “strengthen 
EPS,” “avoid dilution,” “reduce number of shares,” and “provide shares for use 
in executive compensation.” 
EXTEND_BUYBACK An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions the 
following keywords in the news article announcing the buyback: “extension of 
buyback,” “expansion of buyback,” and “authorized additional buyback.” 
NOT_STATE An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company does not state the 
reasons for buyback.  
PRIOR_RETURNS Stock return in the 6 months before buyback or equity issue announcements. 
LOG_MKTCAP Log of equity market capitalization. 
BTM Book-to-market value of equity. 
U-INDEX We calculate the U-index as follows. Companies receive a size score from 1 
(large firms) to 5 (small firms) depending on the quintile of their market value 
of equity in the month before the buyback announcement. We then calculate the 
11-month absolute returns of months −12 to −1 before the announcement for all 
events and assign scores of 5 to the low-return firms and 1 to the high-return 
firms. Finally, companies receive a book-to-market value (BE/ME) score 
depending on the quintile of their BE/ME of equity in the year before the 
buyback announcement, with small BE/ME firms receiving a score of 1 and 
large BE/ME firms receiving a score of 5. Similar to Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009), we use CRSP companies to define the quintile thresholds each month. 
The U-index is the sum of the size s and the book-to-market and momentum 
scores. 
LEVERAGE Short-term debt plus long-term debt, divided by total assets. 
IO Percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure over total assets. 
PAYOUT Common dividend, all scaled by total assets. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. 
LIQUID_ASSETS Current assets minus current liability, scaled by total assets. 
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IDIO_RISK Idiosyncratic volatility measured by (1 − R2), where R2 is the goodness of fit 
from the regression of daily returns over the previous 6 months on the Fama-
French five-factor model. 
VOLATILITY Daily standard deviation of returns during the previous 6 months. 
RELIGIOSITY Percentage of religious adherents at the county level. When the measure is not 
available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value. 
POPULATION Total population at the county level according to the U.S. Census. When the 
measure is not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently 
available value. 
%FEMALE Percentage of females in the county-level population. When the measure is not 
available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value. 
EDUCATION Percentage of population with at least a bachelor’s degree at the county level. 
When the measure is not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the 
most recently available value. 
INCOME Income per capita at the county level. When the measure is not available in a 
year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
INCOME_INEQUALITY Blau Index of income at the county level. 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 − ∑ 𝑝2𝑘𝑖=1 , where p 
is the percentage of people residing in the county that fall in the income category 
i. We have 15 income categories: families with income of less than $10,000, 
with income between $10,000 and $14,999, with income between $15,000 and 
$19,999, with income between $20,000 and $24,999, with income between 
$25,000 and $29,999, with income between $30,000 and $34,999, with income 
between $35,000 and $39,999, with income between $40,000 and $49,999, with 
income between $45,000 and $49,999, with income between $50,000 and 
$74,999, with income between $75,000 and $99,999, with income between 
$100,000 and $124,999, with income between $125,000 and $149,999, with 
income between $150,000 and $199,999, and with income above $200,000. 
When the measure is not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the 
most recently available value. 
ETHNICITY  Percentage of white population at the county level. When the measure is not 
available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value. 
%VOTE_DEMOCRATS Percentage of votes cast for a Democratic president. When the measure is not 
available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value. 
TRUST_C Trust constructed from the GSS. The survey asks whether people can be trusted, 
and respondents can answer “can be trusted” (assigned a value of 3), “can’t be 
trusted” (assigned a value of 1), or “depends or don’t know” (assigned a value 
of 2). We then take the average across all of the respondents from one county to 
obtain a county-level measure of trust for each year. When the trust measure is 
not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value.  
CEO_TENURE Number of years that an executive is a CEO of a firm. 
 
AAER An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company is subject to 
Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases enforcement actions in year t and zero otherwise. 
EMPLOYEE_TRUST Log of employee satisfaction ranking from Fortune 100 Best Company to Work 
for in America.  
INTEGRITY An indicator variable that takes value of one if a CEO’s integrity is in the top 
tercile in a year. CEO’s integrity is developed from Li et al. (2020), which 
captures integrity-related words and respect-related words from earnings 
conference calls. 
E-INDEX E-Index is based on six provisions, four of which constitute limitations on 
shareholders’ voting power, and the remaining two are measures against hostile 
takeover. 




%EQUITY Value of restricted stock grants plus the value of option grants, scaled by total 
compensation. 
DELTA Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price. Obtained from Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006; 2013). 
VEGA Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 change in the standard 




Figure 1 Average Trust by States 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. Figure 1 produces the heat map for average trust by states. The darker the color, the higher the average trust in that state. We do 
not have trust data for any counties for the states of Maryland or New Hampshire. 
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Figure 2 Calendar Time Portfolio Returns—Shares Repurchases 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. The benchmark model is the Carhart four-factor model. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A. One-Way Sort by Trust 
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TABLE 1  
Summary Statistics 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix B.  
Panel A Share Buyback  
  N Mean Median SD P25 P75 
ADJ_RET5 7,649 0.006 0.005 0.019 −0.004 0.015 
TRUST 7,649 0.562 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
TRUST_C 7,649 1.847 1.800 0.486 1.500 2.143 
UNDERVALUE 7,649 0.176 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 
REDUCE_AGENCY 7,649 0.283 0.000 0.450 0.000 1.000 
EPS_MGT 7,649 0.039 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 
EXTEND_BUYBACK 7,649 0.082 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.000 
NOT_STATE 7,649 0.534 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
U-INDEX 7,649 9.034 9.000 3.191 6.000 12.000 
PRIOR_RETURNS 7,649 0.015 0.006 0.263 −0.147 0.158 
LOG_MKTCAP 7,649 6.956 7.010 2.076 5.507 8.375 
BTM 7,649 0.538 0.416 0.435 0.255 0.683 
LEVERAGE 7,649 0.173 0.142 0.168 0.006 0.288 
IO 7,649 0.138 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 
CAPEX 7,649 0.052 0.037 0.049 0.019 0.067 
PAYOUT 7,649 0.012 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.014 
ROA 7,649 0.073 0.068 0.105 0.032 0.115 
LIQUID_ASSETS 7,649 0.267 0.242 0.226 0.080 0.416 
IDIO_RISK 7,649 0.726 0.752 0.179 0.601 0.876 
VOLATILITY 7,649 0.027 0.024 0.014 0.017 0.034 
LOG_POPULATION 7,649 1.709 1.127 1.869 0.709 1.721 
%FEMALE 7,649 0.510 0.509 0.010 0.503 0.517 
EDUCATION 7,649 0.346 0.337 0.091 0.271 0.413 
INCOME 7,649 2.858 2.690 0.751 2.314 3.346 
ETHNICITY 7,649 0.679 0.688 0.138 0.563 0.791 
%VOTE_DEMOCRATS 7,649 0.568 0.565 0.121 0.483 0.641 
INCOME_INEQUALITY 7,649 0.906 0.910 0.018 0.895 0.921 
Panel B Buyback Reasons Provided 
Number of Announcements Citing the Following Reasons    
  N %    
UNDERVALUE  1,348 15.8    
REDUCE_AGENCY  2,162 25.4    
EPS_MGT  295 3.5    
EXTEND_BUYBACK  626 7.3    
NOT_STATE  4,088 48.0           
       
Number of Reasons Provided       
Only one reason provided  2,827 37.0    
Two reasons provided  606 7.9    
More than two reasons provided  128 1.7    





The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] 
[1] ADJ_RET5 1.00                        
[2] TRUST 0.05 1.00                       
[3] UNDERVALUE 0.05 0.01 1.00                      
[4] REDUCE_AGENCY −0.02 −0.01 0.12 1.00                     
[5] EPS_MGT −0.01 0.00 0.08 0.03 1.00                    
[6] EXTEND_BUYBACK 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 1.00                   
[7] U-INDEX 0.14 −0.03 0.09 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 1.00                  
[8] PRIOR_RETURNS −0.09 −0.04 −0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.57 1.00                 
[9] LOG_MKTCAP −0.17 0.03 −0.13 0.03 0.03 0.05 −0.75 0.22 1.00                
[10] BTM 0.12 −0.05 0.05 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03 0.67 −0.27 −0.50 1.00               
[11] LEVERAGE −0.05 −0.07 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.12 0.04 0.17 −0.01 1.00              
[12] IO −0.02 0.01 −0.05 0.06 0.00 0.07 −0.13 0.07 0.16 −0.08 −0.02 1.00             
[13] CAPEX 0.01 −0.04 0.00 −0.08 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04 0.00 −0.05 0.13 −0.04 1.00            
[14] PAYOUT −0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 −0.09 0.03 0.08 −0.06 0.00 −0.02 0.00 1.00           
[15] ROA 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 −0.25 0.06 0.18 −0.34 −0.13 0.04 0.08 0.05 1.00          
[16] LIQUID_ASSETS 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.28 −0.11 −0.39 0.10 −0.51 −0.06 −0.24 −0.03 0.09 1.00         
[17] IDIO_RISK 0.12 −0.01 0.09 −0.11 −0.02 −0.04 0.33 −0.07 −0.50 0.20 −0.04 −0.15 0.07 0.00 −0.04 0.14 1.00        
[18] VOLATILITY 0.18 0.06 0.11 −0.08 0.01 −0.06 0.36 −0.28 −0.52 0.28 −0.20 −0.15 0.08 −0.09 −0.14 0.34 0.22 1.00       
[19] LOG_POPULATION −0.01 −0.17 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 0.05 −0.01 −0.05 0.05 −0.02 −0.01 0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 1.00      
[20] %FEMALE −0.04 −0.13 0.02 0.00 −0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.16 −0.04 −0.02 0.04 −0.01 −0.17 0.04 −0.15 −0.16 1.00     
[21] EDUCATION −0.02 0.26 −0.05 0.06 0.01 −0.01 −0.10 0.02 0.13 −0.07 −0.08 0.08 −0.16 0.00 −0.02 0.05 −0.14 −0.03 −0.28 −0.05 1.00    
[22] INCOME −0.06 0.20 −0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 −0.11 0.04 0.19 −0.07 −0.07 0.10 −0.19 0.01 −0.02 0.03 −0.23 −0.12 −0.24 0.04 0.88 1.00   
[23] ETHNICITY 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.05 −0.02 −0.11 −0.01 0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.02 −0.40 0.06 0.01 −0.03 1.00  
[24] %VOTE_DEMOCRATS −0.01 0.02 −0.03 0.03 −0.02 0.00 −0.05 0.02 0.10 0.01 −0.07 0.01 −0.13 0.01 −0.04 0.03 −0.10 −0.05 0.13 0.33 0.32 0.38 −0.55 1.00 






Long-Term Excess Returns 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. We estimate all regressions using OLS. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Intercepts are included but unreported. The t-
statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of 
coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
      
TRUST 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.58)*** (2.96)*** (3.47)*** (2.89)*** 
UNDERVALUE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.94)* (2.08)** (1.94)* (2.08)** 
REDUCE_AGENCY 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.10) (1.15) (1.17) (1.23) 
EPS_MGT −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.24) (−0.30) (−0.45) (−0.51) 
EXTEND_BUYBACK 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (2.44)** (2.58)*** (2.45)** (2.58)*** 
PRIOR_RETURNS −0.002 −0.002   
 (−1.81)* (−1.83)*   
LOG_MKTCAP −0.001 −0.001   
 (−3.59)*** (−3.75)***   
BTM 0.003 0.003   
 (4.21)*** (4.27)***   
U-INDEX   0.001 0.001 
   (7.20)*** (7.39)*** 
LEVERAGE −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 
 (−1.15) (−0.85) (−1.14) (−0.84) 
IO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.22)** (2.02)** (2.27)** (2.09)** 
CAPEX 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.45) (0.42) 
PAYOUT −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 
 (−0.44) (−0.41) (−0.42) (−0.39) 
ROA 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 (1.86)* (1.96)* (1.29) (1.37) 
LIQUID_ASSETS −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 
 (−1.87)* (−2.19)** (−1.79)* (−2.08)** 
IDIO_RISK 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.78) (0.77) (1.59) (1.64) 
VOLATILITY 0.092 0.087 0.117 0.112 
 (3.37)*** (3.14)*** (4.44)*** (4.27)*** 
POPULATION  −0.000  −0.000 
  (−1.14)  (−1.12) 
%FEMALE  −0.074  −0.071 
  (−2.73)***  (−2.61)*** 
EDUCATION  0.002  0.001 
  (0.28)  (0.18) 
INCOME  −0.001  −0.001 
  (−1.57)  (−1.52) 
ETHNICITY  −0.001  −0.000 
  (−0.31)  (−0.19) 
%VOTE_DEMOCRATS  0.006  0.006 
  (2.09)**  (2.18)** 
INCOME_INEQUALITY  −0.034  −0.032 
  (−1.52)  (−1.46)      
     
Observations 7,649 7,649 7,649 7,649 
R-squared 0.102 0.104 0.099 0.101 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Calendar Time Portfolio Returns 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix B.  
  FF 4-Factor Model     FF 5-Factor Model 
  Monthly AR p-value    Monthly AR p-value 
12 Month Low Trust 0.431% 0.002  12 Month Low Trust 0.113% 0.002 
 2 0.620% 0.000   2 0.362% 0.000 
 3 0.714% 0.000   3 0.456% 0.000 
 High Trust 0.657% 0.000   High Trust 0.403% 0.000          
         
24 Month Low Trust 0.431% 0.000  24 Month Low Trust 0.137% 0.000 
 2 0.524% 0.000   2 0.285% 0.000 
 3 0.695% 0.000   3 0.467% 0.000 
 High Trust 0.787% 0.000   High Trust 0.612% 0.000          
         
36 Month Low Trust 0.387% 0.000  36 Month Low Trust 0.108% 0.000 
 2 0.463% 0.000   2 0.198% 0.000 
 3 0.604% 0.000   3 0.382% 0.000 
 High Trust 0.722% 0.000   High Trust 0.572% 0.000          
         
48 Month Low Trust 0.347% 0.001  48 Month Low Trust 0.055% 0.001 
 2 0.439% 0.000   2 0.181% 0.000 
 3 0.566% 0.001   3 0.344% 0.001 






Two-Way Sorted Calendar Time Portfolio Returns 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
FF 4-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months  Horizon=24 Months  Horizon=36 Months  Horizon=48 Months 
 Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index 
Low Trust 0.20% 0.44% 0.85%  Low Trust 0.30% 0.33% 1.00%  Low Trust 0.30% 0.33% 0.82%  Low Trust 0.34% 0.30% 0.70% 
p-value 0.121 0.009 0.000  p-value 0.009 0.012 0.000  p-value 0.008 0.009 0.000  p-value 0.002 0.014 0.000                    
2 0.37% 0.48% 1.20%  2 0.35% 0.53% 0.99%  2 0.31% 0.41% 0.86%  2 0.28% 0.38% 0.73% 
p-value 0.007 0.005 0.000  p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000  p-value 0.004 0.003 0.000  p-value 0.007 0.004 0.000                    
High Trust 0.36% 0.70% 0.73%  High Trust 0.48% 0.71% 1.12%  High Trust 0.50% 0.68% 0.88%  High Trust 0.50% 0.68% 0.88% 
p-value 0.055 0.000 0.011   p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FF 5-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months  Horizon=24 Months  Horizon=36 Months  Horizon=48 Months 
 Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index   Low U-Index 2 High U-Index 
Low Trust -0.07% 0.13% 0.51%  Low Trust 0.02% 0.02% 0.80%  Low Trust 0.02% 0.01% 0.63%  Low Trust 0.05% 0.00% 0.48% 
p-value 0.121 0.009 0.000  p-value 0.009 0.012 0.000  p-value 0.008 0.009 0.000  p-value 0.002 0.014 0.000                    
2 0.14% 0.22% 0.92%  2 0.12% 0.24% 0.78%  2 0.04% 0.15% 0.65%  2 0.00% 0.14% 0.54% 
p-value 0.007 0.005 0.000  p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000  p-value 0.004 0.003 0.000  p-value 0.007 0.004 0.000                    
High Trust 0.01% 0.47% 0.54%  High Trust 0.18% 0.50% 1.09%  High Trust 0.26% 0.50% 0.83%  High Trust 0.25% 0.48% 0.82% 




Buyback Motivation and Trust 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. We estimate all regressions using OLS. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Intercepts are included but unreported. The t-statistics are 
presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-
sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
          
TRUST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.31)** (2.21)** (1.82)* (1.77)* 
TRUST×UNDERVALUE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.65)* (1.69)* (1.68)* (1.72)* 
TRUST×REDUCE_AGENCY −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.26) (−0.25) (−0.20) (−0.19) 
TRUST×EPS_MGT −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.05) (−0.17) (−0.11) (−0.23) 
TRUST×EXTEND_BUYBACK −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.20) (−0.21) (−0.08) (−0.09) 
UNDERVALUE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.08) 
REDUCE_AGENCY 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.95) (0.99) (0.94) (0.99) 
EPS_MGT −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.13) (−0.19) (−0.12) (−0.18) 
EXTEND_BUYBACK 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.86)* (1.88)* (1.87)* (1.88)* 
PRIOR_RETURNS −0.002  −0.002  
 (−1.83)*  (−1.86)*  
LOG_MKTCAP −0.001  −0.001  
 (−3.62)***  (−3.80)***  
BTM 0.003  0.003  
 (4.21)***  (4.27)***  
U-INDEX  0.001  0.001 
  (7.25)***  (7.44)*** 
LEVERAGE −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 
 (−1.14) (−1.13) (−0.85) (−0.83) 
IO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.20)** (2.26)** (2.00)** (2.08)** 
CAPEX 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.64) (0.43) (0.62) (0.40) 
PAYOUT −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 
 (−0.45) (−0.42) (−0.42) (−0.40) 
ROA 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 
 (1.88)* (1.32) (1.98)** (1.40) 
LIQUID_ASSETS −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 
 (−1.88)* (−1.80)* (−2.20)** (−2.09)** 
IDIO_RISK 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.79) (1.60) (0.78) (1.66)* 
VOLATILITY 0.092 0.116 0.086 0.112 
 (3.35)*** (4.43)*** (3.13)*** (4.26)*** 
POPULATION   −0.000 −0.000 
   (−1.11) (−1.09) 
%FEMALE   −0.073 −0.070 
   (−2.72)*** (−2.60)*** 
EDUCATION   0.001 0.001 
   (0.22) (0.11) 
INCOME   −0.001 −0.001 
   (−1.51) (−1.47) 
ETHNICITY   −0.001 −0.001 
   (−0.39) (−0.27) 
%VOTE_DEMOCRATS   0.006 0.006 
   (2.06)** (2.15)** 
INCOME_INEQUALITY   −0.035 −0.033 
   (−1.57) (−1.52)      
     
Observations 7,649 7,649 7,649 7,649 
R-squared 0.102 0.099 0.104 0.101 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Validation of Trust Measure 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. Panel A reports the results where we regress AAER dummy on 
TRUST and control variables in a firm-year sample. The regression sample is constructed at the intersection of 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) information from the SEC website, trust data from GSS 
and financial information from the Compustat and CRSP database. Panel B and C report the results using the 
alternative measures of trust for our share buyback sample. We estimate all regressions using OLS. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B. The table contains the same set of controls 
as Table 3. Intercepts are included but unreported. The t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Corporate Misreporting 
  (1) 
 AAER 
   
TRUST −0.003 





Firm FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Panel B Employee Trust of Managers 
  (1) 
 ADJ_RET5 
   
EMPLOYEE_TRUST 0.003 





Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Panel C CEO Integrity 
  (1) 
 ADJ_RET5 
   
INTEGRITY 0.001 





Industry FE Yes 




Trust and CEO Tenure 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. We estimate all regressions using OLS. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Intercepts are included but unreported. The table contains the same set of controls as Table 3. The t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.71) (0.20) (0.51) (0.06) 
TRUST×CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.82)* (1.75)* (1.74)* (1.69)* 
CEO_TENURE −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.93) (−0.84) (−0.87) (−0.78)      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,092 5,092 5,092 5,092 
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.115 0.120 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2016. We estimate all regressions using OLS. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Intercepts are included but unreported. The table contains the same set of controls as Table 3. The t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Panel A Keep Only Big Counties 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (3.92)*** (2.92)*** (3.86)*** (2.90)***      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,625 5,625 5,625 5,625 
R-squared 0.103 0.107 0.101 0.105 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B Weight by Survey Response Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.08)** (1.74)* (1.98)** (1.63)      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,649 7,649 7,649 7,649 
R-squared 0.133 0.136 0.132 0.135 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel C No Interpolation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (3.86)*** (3.28)*** (3.86)*** (3.29)***      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 
R-squared 0.113 0.118 0.112 0.117 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel D Continuous Trust Measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST_C 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.96)*** (2.17)** (2.85)*** (2.13)**      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,649 7,649 7,649 7,649 
R-squared 0.101 0.103 0.098 0.100 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel E Control for State Economic Conditions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.13)*** (2.72)*** (3.03)*** (2.68)***      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,649 7,649 7,649 7,649 
R-squared 0.110 0.112 0.107 0.109 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel F Control for Governance Quality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.41)*** (2.61)*** (3.14)*** (2.43)** 
E-INDEX −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 
 (−0.58) (−0.30) (−0.07) (0.19)      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,238 4,238 4,238 4,238 
R-squared 0.144 0.151 0.138 0.144 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel G Control for CEO Compensation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 ADJ_RET5 
         
TRUST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.00)*** (2.24)** (2.80)*** (2.07)** 
TOTAL_COMP −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 
 (−2.13)** (−2.12)** (−3.72)*** (−3.77)*** 
%EQUITY 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.80)* (1.66)* (2.13)** (2.02)** 
DELTA −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.69) (−0.56) (−1.39) (−1.30) 
VEGA 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (0.57) (0.08) (−0.16) (−0.69) 
          
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,838 4,838 4,838 4,838 
R-squared 0.127 0.134 0.123 0.130 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
